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How do local governments change? 
Variations in time and place for  
conflicts in different reforms
Jenni Airaksinen ja Arto Haveri
Abstract
Local government reforms are complex processes, where different frames define the attitudes 
towards reform efforts. In a situation where contradicting frames are visible, a frame conflict 
is possible and even probable. In this article we focus on the organizational dimensions of 
rescaling and the contingent character of governing tools. We focus on the important question 
concerning the relation of reforms, structures and institutions, and seek to answer how these 
different tools for reform have been able to affect the nationally, regionally and locally defined 
attitudes towards the desired futures of local government. We also analyze the disadvantages 
and strengths of different governing tools in producing change in local governance systems.
Introduction
Despite several studies focusing on public 
sector reforms and organizational changes, 
our knowledge about local-level institutional 
and structural change is still limited. Particu-
larly the relationship between different means 
and tools of reforms and the changes that are 
realized (in the context of local government) 
call for more exploration. As Sanderson 
(2000, 447) expressed it, there is a need for 
approaches able to develop understanding of 
how policies and programs are implemented 
in practice; how they actually generate effects 
and change over time; and how their success 
depends on contextual circumstances and in-
terrelationships with other policies and proc-
esses. In general, there is an increasing ac-
knowledgement of the significance of the in-
stitutional and organizational context in the 
study of public sector reforms.
This article deals with the organizational 
dimension of change; the process during which 
municipalities as local-level actors make deci-
sions and implement structural changes in 
order to improve their performance. Our argu-
mentation is based on examination of two re-
forms, and especially the frame conflicts that 
occurred during the reforms that focused on 
rescaling of Finnish local governance.
We focus on the important question con-
cerning the relation between reform, struc-
tures and institutions. We seek to determine 
how different approaches to reform have been 
able to affect the nationally, regionally and 
locally defined attitudes towards the desired 
futures of local government. We also analyze 
the disadvantages and strengths of different 
governance approaches in producing change 
in local governance systems. How can the dy-
namic change of local government amid deep-
ly rooted institutional practices and conflicts 
be understood?
Our research questions are:
1) What do different times and places of con-
flicts tell us about network and hierarchy-
based reform processes?
2) What is the role of networks and hierar-
chies as governance tools in producing 
structural and institutional change in local 
government?
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Frames, institutional theory and 
reforms
In the theoretical framework, our main inter-
est focuses first on frames and institutional 
theory, and secondly on hierarchies and net-
works as tools of governance. Framing and 
frame, in our approach, refer to the process 
when actors in municipalities describe and 
interpret the reform event, giving it meaning 
and trying to figure out how they should react 
to it. Frames are largely built upon underlying 
structures of beliefs, values, and experiences, 
and this is why local-level actors construct 
frames that differ in significant ways. Differ-
ent interpretations exist as parallel ways of 
contemplating the reality of administrative 
reform and are equally true. These different 
interpretations – frames – define the attitudes 
towards reform. Frames help individuals to 
locate themselves and give order to the infor-
mation around them (Goffmann 1974). Frames 
carry meanings and produce presumptions for 
situations and actions. We use framing to 
structure and arrange information. (Gray 
2003, 12–14.) A frame is our response to the 
question “what is happening?” (Gitlin 1980). 
In this article we use frames as analytical tools 
for exploring the differences and similarities 
between different ways of interpreting local 
government reforms.
We see local-level governments as institu-
tions. Institutions have many different defini-
tions in organizational theories, but they are 
usually seen as value-based manifestations of 
social order. (Selznick 1957, 17). Institutions 
emerge at different levels of social life; we see 
institutions both in global life and in personal 
relationships. Institutions sustain continuity, 
but at the same time they are susceptible to 
gradual and radical changes in society. (Scott 
1995, 33)
Institutional theory highlights the impor-
tance of institutions in shaping social action, 
picturing actors embedded in a structural-in-
stitutional context, including organizational 
arrangements, working procedures, rhetoric 
and values (Scott 1995; Fischer 2003). In lo-
cal government reforms, nationally steered 
and planned structural changes create the “up-
per level setting” for change and decisions 
finally made at the local level. However, the 
actors frame and renew their policies differ-
ently inside this general framework. Different 
frames can significantly affect the intractabil-
ity of a conflict by creating mutually incom-
patible interpretations of what is happening.
We assume decision-makers in munici-
palities to be goal-oriented and rational, 
though in a varied way; people who pursue 
their interests and making use of their powers 
to achieve their goals. But at the same time, 
we presume that institutions create meanings 
for the interpretations on suitable actions and 
thus influence the way municipalities make 
decisions on reform actions (see Berger & 
Luckmann 1966; March & Olsen 1987; DiM-
aggio & Powell 1991; Hall & Taylor 1996). 
As defined by Ostrom (1980): “Rules are 
crafted through pen and paper when constitu-
tions, legislation and policy are formulated; 
but they also evolve through the artisanship 
and bricolage of institutional actors.”
Hierarchies and networks  
as reform tools
The reforms studied make use of different 
governance tools in trying to reform local 
government functions. With regard to tools, 
for our study we distinguish hierarchical tools 
from network tools and define the different 
approaches by the amount of obligatory and 
voluntary elements included in the reform.
Governance tools in our approach refer to 
methods and tools for the coordination and 
steering of otherwise separate activities, the 
creation of common goals, the implementation 
of policies and for the resolution of conflicts. 
Governance tools are basically a question of 
how society is organized and how it functions 
as a social structure. Reform is a question of 
determining which tool to apply in a particu-
lar case in relation to specific concerns.
Differences in the two tools of governance 
are best illustrated by looking at their orienta-
tion towards the use of authoritative power. In 
the purest mode of hierarchy, considerable use 
of authoritative power is the normal way of 
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proceeding (Savitch & Vogel, 1996, 271; 
O’Toole & Meier 2000, 266–267), whereas in 
network mode of governance, authoritative 
power does not exist, but decisions and their 
implementation are based on voluntary action, 
interdependencies and trust (Bradach and Ec-
cles, 1991, 283).
Theoretically, the two are clearly different 
and separated categories, but in real life, it 
might be more useful to illustrate them on a 
continuum (Figure 1) where there are mixed 
governance situations in addition of the clear/
pure ones.
As a governance tool, networks can be 
considered as spontaneous social systems 
where trust helps people to rely on other peo-
ple’s word (Arrow 1974, 23). Trust can 
emerge from different sources and can be pro-
duced in different ways (Zucker 1986, 54). 
But while networks include many positive 
elements from the point of view of endog-
enous and sustainable change, they may pose 
problems which may cancel out the advan-
tages (Tshuma 2000, Rhodes 2000, 72–76). 
Networks may consume lots of energy and 
time, especially if many partners and tasks are 
involved. When the number of cooperative 
parties involved in implementation increases 
within the network, and as the number of de-
cisions requiring collective action grows, the 
prospect for collective action declines (Press-
man and Wildawsky 1984, Ostrom 1980, Fer-
lie and Pettigrew 1996, 95–6). There may also 
be other problems in networks. Such attributes 
as legitimacy, accountability, and implementa-
tion have often been questioned in network 
operations (Keil 2000).
Reforming local government
Idealistically, reforming local governments 
can be seen as a process that has its start in the 
changes taking place in society, and proceeds 
from the interpretations about these changes 
to the aims, tools, implementation and effects, 
which form a process called administrative 
reform (Pollit & Bouckaert 2002). However 
the reality of reforms is much more complex 
than the often somewhat generic principles 
that they are based on. It is known that the 
realization of reforms is extremely challeng-
ing. Reform proposals have sometimes re-
sulted in new practices and new structures, but 
sometimes the structural changes proposed 
and planned have not brought on visible insti-
tutional or organizational changes at the local 
level. In some countries, even among fairly 
similar politico-administrative cultures (for 
example, the Nordic countries) quite dramat-
ic changes have taken place, while in other 
countries reforms have been under discussion 
but have been shelved time and time again. 
(Baldersheim & Rose 2010, 7.)
It is easy to understand that there is no 
universal recipe for appropriate local govern-
ment structure. (see eg. Baldersheim & Rose 
2010, 7). This leads to a fragmented reality 
concerning the right way of carrying out re-
form. We know that local government reforms 
are complex processes where interpretations, 
rhetoric and politics flourish (Haveri 2006). 
Often it is possible to reach consensus on 
pressure for change, the need to do something, 
because of the continuous socio-economic 
change. The interpretations of the character 
and nature and of the forces exerting pressure 
vary, and when it comes to the aims and means 
of the reforms, the interpretations can even 
arise against each other. Sometimes the result 
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is a somewhat redrawn map of local govern-
ment, but sometimes the attempts at redraw-
ing are rejected. (Baldersheim & Rose 2010, 
1, 9) In local government reform processes, 
the tensions between efficiency, tradition, 
identity and democracy have probably been 
under debate the most visibly (see e.g. Dollery 
2010; Hearfield & Dollery 2009; Burdess & 
O’Toole 2004).
The recent trend in reforming local gov-
ernment in Finland has been the pursuit of 
stronger units or broader shoulders, as it is 
expressed in Finnish. “Bigger is better”, has 
been the hegemonic discourse in local govern-
ment reforms in Australia, England and many 
European countries. Increased municipal size 
is seen as leading to greater efficiency. Dol-
lery, Byrnes and Allan (2007, 473) have iden-
tified the main reasons behind the assumption 
that it is useful to increase the size of local 
government. Their analysis is based on Aus-
tralian discussion, but similar assumptions are 
also seen in the discussions held in other 
countries. Economies of scale and scope are 
used as argumentations in service delivery, 
while improved technical and managerial ca-
pacities are seen to improve especially in 
countries with small local government units 
as well as bargaining abilities with the higher 
tiers of government (See Dollery 2010, 117). 
One famous argument is the assumption that 
amalgamations lead to reduced administration 
and compliance costs. Especially in urban ar-
eas, the need for bigger units is justified by 
emphasizing the advantages derived from a 
better fit between municipal boundaries and 
the population of urban areas. These argu-
ments have been quite efficient, because the 
amount of local government units has de-
creased in many countries. In some countries 
the decrease has been quite dramatic while in 
others it has been more moderate. (for more, 
see Baldersheim & Rose 2010, 3.) Next, we 
briefly present two reforms included among 
the group of reforms that strive to strengthen 
the local level government by creating bigger 
units. These reforms took place between the 
years 2000–2012; both tried to produce insti-
tutional changes in the structures and prac-
tices of the local government of Finland.
SEUTU project
Municipalities have considerable autonomy in 
Finland. The municipality itself has the pow-
er to decide whether or not it cooperates or 
amalgamates with another municipality. Cen-
tral administration’s ambition has long been 
to reduce the number of municipalities. But 
because municipal mergers proved very dif-
ficult to implement in practice, promoting 
intermunicipal cooperation was the main 
method of State intervention until the middle 
of the first decade of the 2000’s The most im-
portant of these interventions was the SEUTU 
reform (2001–2005), a multi-sector program 
initiated and implemented by the Ministry of 
Interior.
The goal of the SEUTU reform was to 
promote voluntary (network based) intermu-
nicipal cooperation in order to ensure the 
availability and quality of public services, 
successful local economic development and 
effective implementation of land use planning 
and care of the environment. The project in-
cluded new legislation as well as some finan-
cial incentives to allow eight pilot districts to 
test different, new methods and models of co-
operation. With regard to the intermunicipal 
cooperation organs to be formed, for instance, 
detailed steering was reduced and additional 
power of decision and discretion in discharg-
ing municipal tasks were given.
In all, thirty districts volunteered for the 
pilot project. Eight different types of coop-
eration districts were chosen for the project in 
June 2001, as follows: Hämeenlinnan seu-
tukunta, Lahden kaupunkiseutu, Loimaan 
seutukunta, Nivalan-Haapajärven seutukunta, 
Oulun kaupunkiseutu, Pieksämäen seutu, 
Pohjois-Lapin seutukunta and Turunmaan seu-
tukunta. By Finnish standards, some of these 
cooperation districts are large urban areas 
while others are rural areas with a small pop-
ulation. An important selection criterion was 
that the cooperation districts chosen presented 
ambitious aims about how they would arrange 
cooperation during the experiment.
The governance tool of the project was to 
apply network-based arrangements to solve 
the problems of service-production and mu-
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nicipal planning. Many unofficial, preliminary 
agreements on future services were made and 
a great number of reports on future intermu-
nicipal cooperation was produced. The project 
seemed to proceed quite well, but the results 
were not that convincing and the project was 
quietly buried after 2005.
Self-government experiment  
in Kainuu region (2004–2012)
Reform took a different shape in a special 
self-government experiment in Kainuu region. 
The experiment was launched in 2004 owing 
to the poor economic situation of the munici-
palities, their difficulties in providing serv-
ices, the growing unemployment figures and 
the very challenging demographical develop-
ment. The Kainuu experiment can be seen as 
State-induced reform launched to test differ-
ent aspects of regional self-government by 
moving decision-making powers upwards 
from municipalities to the regional level and 
downwards from central government under 
the decision-making authority of the regional 
council elected directly by the residents of the 
region.
The Kainuu reform has two significant 
differences from earlier intermunicipal coop-
eration models adopted in Finland. Firstly, a 
major share of the functions that used to fall 
under the scope of municipalities’ responsibil-
ity now became the responsibility of a demo-
cratically steered intermunicipal organ. This 
meant that municipalities no longer had the 
decision-making power in these particular 
tasks. This change was a clear reversal com-
pared against other models where the struc-
tures had been looser and the municipalities 
had more or less retained their power. The 
municipalities decided to take part in this ex-
periment, but the tasks were moved to the 
regional council by obligatory legislation.
Secondly, the Kainuu reform was the first 
one in Finland where the decision-making 
power in intermunicipal issues rests in a di-
rectly elected regional council consisting of 
59 representatives. The task of the council is 
to represent the residents of the whole region, 
whereas in other parts of Finland, the mu-
nicipalities chose the regional council mem-
bers to represent them.
The regional hierarchy, established by the 
municipalities, performed the following func-
tions on behalf of the participating munici-
palities: health care and social welfare, upper 
secondary education, regional planning and 
development, and the finance of these func-
tions. The region was also responsible for 
general economic development policy 
throughout the region. The directly elected 
regional council made decisions concerning 
the administrative regulations and other stand-
ing orders, the annual budget and the alloca-
tion of funding to the region’s various activi-
ties. The council also had to ensure that resi-
dents throughout the region had adequate 
access to the services provided by the joint 
authority. (Jäntti et al. 2010, 18.)
Both of the presented reforms were based 
on similar arguments concerning the need for 
change and similar reform goals. According 
to the documentation on the arguments under-
lying both reforms, three main challenges are 
described to threaten local level service deliv-
ery in Finland: weakening municipal finances; 
a rapidly aging population including an aging 
local workforce; and an increasing propensity 
among Finnish citizens for internal migration. 
Both reforms aimed to ensure that high-qual-
ity services continue to be provided by local 
governments in the future. The reforms have 
naturally focused on services owing to the 
Finnish municipal structure, where the local 
level is responsible for almost all of the serv-
ices regardless of the size of the municipality. 
The tools, however, have been divergent. 
While the SEUTU reform sought the answer 
through voluntary network-type arrangements, 
the Kainuu reform took a clear, legally de-
fined hierarchy as its main tool. We argue that 
the tool applied is not insignificant, especial-
ly from the point of view of the times and 
places of the conflicts that have occurred. 
Within the conflicts, different ways of inter-
preting the reform and the core of the matter 
have clashed.
Next we present the three frames that have 
surfaced in conflicts in both of the reforms we 
scrutinized. From the point of view of these 
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different frames, the phenomenon of local 
government reform is experienced and inter-
preted differently.
Frame 1: Local government reform as adap-
tion into the environment. Local government 
reform is a way to adapt to socioeconomic 
changes. The frame has its roots in percep-
tions whereby old structures are outdated and 
new forms of governance as well as bigger 
units are needed to address society’s compli-
cated and wicked problems. This view sees 
municipalities as a way of handling society’s 
various tasks in either a broad or a narrow 
scope. Local government change is simply a 
tool for responding to societal changes. This 
is a quite vague, macro-level interpretation 
that has largely been accepted in the public 
discussion on local level reforms in many 
countries.
Frame 2: Local government reform as an 
intervention in order to secure services. The 
goal of this frame is to secure services for the 
municipal residents. Local government is a 
tool that implements national level policies at 
the local level Municipalities are not able to 
revise their functions without the support of 
the national level, but sticks and carrots as 
well as information are needed for them to be 
able to cope with the challenges they face. 
The institutional interpretation accentuate that 
fewer and larger local authorities (amalga-
mated or other joint authorities) enable Finn-
ish local governments to combine resources 
to address the challenges posed by an aging 
and mobile population. It is based on the as-
sumption that a larger local authority benefits 
from economies of scale in its purchasing and 
delivery of goods and services. The structures 
and tasks of local government are national 
concerns, and local government is an object 
for change. In the context of this frame, bigger 
seems better; local governments are seen as 
inefficient, unprofessional and in urgent need 
of reform. (See e.g. Dollery et al. 2010, 23.)
Frame 3: Local government reform as a way 
to hollow out the local level. Hollowing out 
occurs either by stripping local governments 
of all their tasks or by severing their roots to 
their genuine territorial entities. As a result, 
small and rural municipalities lose their vital-
ity and later their residents. Autonomous local 
government has the right to decide on the 
structures and practices of democracy and 
service-provision. This is linked with the dis-
cussion on territorial identities and the sig-
nificance of tradition and local innovations as 
solutions to local problems. Structural, stand-
ardized solutions are not seen as functional in 
solving locally rooted problems and problems 
in different operational environments. One 
size does not fit all. (Dollery et al. 2010, 24.)
Different frames sustain different realities that 
in are at least partly conflicting. The frames 
presented have existed side by side in the real-
ity of reforming the local level government, 
and it is quite clear that the picture is not 
without contradictions. In a situation where 
contradicting frames can be seen, a conflict 
between frames is possible and even probable. 
Reforming local governance is a field where 
the relationship between different strategic 
interests and their struggles become evident 
at some point.
Depending on the frame, the reform was 
experienced and interpreted differently. Frame 
1 was the connecting frame, which included 
all the vague statements contending that some-
thing has to be done. It was very easy to reach 
a broad consensus on that. Frame 2 and frame 
3 were the ones that clashed. A conflict be-
tween frames occurred in both reform cases, 
but it became visible in different places and 
at different times. Here we strive to interpret 
that and contemplate on the role of different 
reform tools.
Analysis
Seutu reform: Good cooperation and 
vast consensus but no visible results
In the final evaluation of the SEUTU project 
(Airaksinen et al. 2005), conflicts between 
frames were clearly visible in this network-
oriented change. The study revealed how the 
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key decision-makers in the pilot districts rec-
ognized the need for increased cooperation 
along the lines presented in frame 1. In this 
frame, local governments were seen to be fac-
ing more and more complicated problems that 
they couldn’t easily solve alone. Growing 
problems called for new strategies, and coop-
eration with other local governments seemed 
to be a rational way of providing services or 
strengthening a municipality’s competitive 
standing.
But the other, and quite opposite, frame 
began to gain influence as the municipalities 
approached the concrete and more detailed 
level of decisions on reform. Decisions at this 
stage often require the dismantling of existing 
structures; this, in turn, means that munici-
palities have to relinquish some of their deci-
sion-making power to joint organizations. 
When the frame changes from the general to 
the specific, the essential changes in the deci-
sion-makers’ frame cause the ability to make 
decisions to become blurred.
Nearly all conflicts between frames cul-
minated just before the finish line, when the 
municipalities were supposed to make deci-
sions on the structural changes in their service 
organization or to make decisions that would 
transfer decision-making power from the mu-
nicipalities to the intermunicipal bodies. This 
phenomenon of “backing up from the finish 
line” was clearly seen in one incident where 
the municipalities of one region planned to 
adopt a directly elected regional council to 
take responsibility for making-decisions on 
behalf of the municipalities. All five of the 
regions’ municipalities were certain that they 
would be ready to elect a new regional coun-
cil already in 2004. In the process of drafting 
the legislation, the five municipalities gave 
the initiative green light on three separate oc-
casions. The legislation was drafted success-
fully and national level officials and politi-
cians made the necessary decisions in short 
order. The fourth time the case was presented 
to the municipal councils, only two of the mu-
nicipalities decided to support the initiative, 
two unexpectedly rejected the initiative and 
one was ready to support it but postpone the 
implementation for four years.
In public, the project appeared to be pro-
ceeding quite smoothly, but basically, no im-
portant decisions on intermunicipal arrange-
ment of functions were reached. The lack of 
new cooperative arrangements was quite a 
surprise in view of the very convincing plans 
and reports drawn up in the early stage of the 
project. A gap between the speeches made in 
seminars and conferences and the actual re-
sults was also apparent. The evaluators of the 
project called the phenomenon ’the rhetorical 
wall’, a device that was used to hide the real 
difficulties encountered in accomplishing 
changes at the level of decisions and practices. 
(See Haveri 2008.) By the end of the first 
phase of the project, it was accepted that vol-
untary cooperation is not the solution to the 
difficult problems faced by municipalities.
Our interpretation is that the conflicts be-
tween frames made it impossible for local-
level decision-makers to make decisions 
solely from the regional point of view, as their 
mandates were obtained from local-level vot-
ers. The project was not evaluated as having 
been a great success. A new mode of local 
governance based on intermunicipal coopera-
tion was not adopted as it should have been 
according to the plans and goals that had been 
defined. Throughout the project there was a 
great discrepancy between goals and ex-
pressed needs, on the one hand, and the con-
crete decisions actually taken, on the other.
Kainuu reform: Conflicts  
on many fronts
Contrary to the SEUTU reform, the Kainuu 
reform included many compulsory elements 
that would transfer decision-making power 
from different actors to the elected regional 
council. It is therefore understandable that 
conflicts of frame became visible at very ear-
ly stages of the experiment. Moreover, the 
preparation phase of the experiment was af-
fected by multidimensional lack of trust. The 
national level actors, which perceived the Kai-
nuu region as an object of administration, 
were afraid to relinquish their power to a re-
gional entity for a set amount of time. The 
municipal actors, for their part, criticised the 
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experiment because it stripped them of much 
budgetary power and transferred almost 60% 
of their tasks to the regional level. They saw 
the reform clearly from Frame 3 and were 
afraid that it would hollow out the tasks and 
power at the local level. The situation was dif-
ficult for the municipal actors, as the future of 
the region’s municipal finances was dismal 
and the small municipalities struggled to pro-
vide social and healthcare services. On the 
one hand it seemed tempting to get rid of the 
most difficult and expensive sector of their 
municipalities, but on the other hand they 
were concerned about the loss of power and 
they feared the relocation of local services. 
(Airaksinen et al., 2005.)
The successful first phase of implementa-
tion of the experiment stemmed from two 
main reasons. The first was the quick and de-
termined action of the central government. 
The experiment was launched by one of the 
leading politicians of the time and even 
though parts of the central government re-
jected the idea, it acted effectively during the 
preparation of the legislation. The region’s 
leading politicians and clerks also proved to 
be crucial for the implementation of the first 
phase of the experiment. The development of 
the regional service-delivery system was led 
by a locally distinguished medical doctor also 
known for his leadership abilities. Together 
with a group of municipal managers and lead-
ing local politicians, he worked on behalf of 
the reform and was able to create a positive 
atmosphere for it. From the point of view of 
the municipalities, the timetable was too tight: 
opposing actors did not have time to organize 
their actions and when they acted, it was al-
ready too late: the parliament had already ap-
proved the Government proposal on the ex-
periment. This hurry and the subsequent bit-
terness of the resisting actors resulted later in 
many bursts of conflict during the experiment. 
(Airaksinen et al. 2008, 202.)
Bursts of frame conflicts have been con-
tinuous. The first frame conflict burst oc-
curred when the national parliament had to 
vote on transferring upper secondary educa-
tion to the regional level. The teacher profes-
sion was one the rare groups that were suc-
cessful in organizing their opposition to 
Kainuu-experiment. The group is small but 
they were loud enough almost to succeed in 
subverting the whole reform before it started. 
Their arguments were compatible with the 
frame of hollowing out the local level. Upper 
secondary education (secondary schools in 
particular) was seen to be crucial to the vital-
ity of small rural municipalities. With the 
transfer of secondary schools to be subject to 
regional-level decision-making power, the 
fear of receding services culminated in claims 
that the loss of the school would be a death 
blow to local communities. From the point of 
view of the defenders of the experiment, the 
rationale underlying the whole reform was to 
secure the prerequisites for producing upper 
secondary education in the region by using 
resources more effectively and by enabling 
considerable cooperation between different 
schools
Once the experiment was launched, the 
conflicts continued to emerge. One extreme 
example was a private attempt to affect deci-
sion-making concerning regional-level health 
care services. An elderly man went on a hun-
ger strike to oppose the structural changes that 
took place during the first two years of the 
Kainuu reform. The structural changes had 
affected three local health centers, moving all 
or part of the health care services a little fur-
ther away. The hunger strike continued for 31 
days and was ended only when the regional 
council decided to produce a set of definitions 
for the immediate services to be provided in 
all of the region’s municipalities. From the 
point of view of the defenders of the experi-
ment, the question was about rational deci-
sions aiming at cutting costs and responding 
to the lack of medical doctors. It was impos-
sible to hire medical professionals for the 
small units, so it seemed natural to concen-
trate by forming functional units having more 
patients and staff members. (Jäntti, Airak-
sinen & Haveri. 2010, 196.)
The evaluation reports on the Kainuu re-
form clearly stated that during the reform, the 
regional managers and leading politicians at 
regional level and in some municipalities had 
begun to understand and accept the emergence 
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of the conflicting frames. (See Airaksinen et 
al. 2005, Airaksinen et al. 2008 and Jäntti et 
al. 2010) At the same time, municipal politi-
cians, municipal residents and even some mu-
nicipal employees continued to have critical 
perceptions. The bitterness and fears had not 
melted away; they had materialized in differ-
ent forms. The structures had changed but the 
perceptions had not. The final burst of frame 
conflict proved to be the downfall of the 
whole reform. In 2011, the municipalities 
were scheduled to decide on extending the 
experimental legislation. One out of the eight 
participating municipalities refused to con-
tinue the experiment: the arguments presented 
were familiar from the conflicts that had aris-
en during the earlier stages of the experiment. 
One of the small municipalities stated that the 
bigger entity had not been able to listen to the 
needs of a small and remote municipality. The 
nail in the coffin was the decision made by the 
seven other municipalities to give their State 
subsidies for social and health care to the re-
gional level. The municipalities had previ-
ously been able to use State subsidy surpluses 
for local development and Puolanka, the mu-
nicipality that caused the downfall of the 
whole experiment, had been lucky enough to 
have a surplus that eased municipal finances.
Discussion
First we present our four main results in a nut-
shell, and then we contemplate them briefly.
1. Conflicts are a natural part of local govern-
ment change. The times and places of con-
flicts reveal something about the nature – 
the strengths and weaknesses – of specific 
reform tools
2. Network-based reform is time consuming 
and messy. At its worst it can lead to proc-
ess that consumes a lot of effort to repro-
duce old action patterns, but it is better at 
creating meanings for actors and probably 
yields more legitimate and enduring struc-
tures than the hierarchy model
3. Hierarchy-based reform rapidly produces 
visible changes better than the network-
based model. The downside is a weak abil-
ity to change institutions, and conflicts that 
can paralyze structures if left untreated.
4. The creation of structures, and changing 
institutions, take time as well as an open, 
reciprocal relationship between actors 
functioning in an atmosphere of rival 
frames based on arguments differing in 
rationale.
Conflicts are a natural part of local govern-
ment change, given that various actors with 
their dissenting views are involved in the 
processes. The actors interpret and frame re-
form aims and events differently from their 
own perspective and their experience, giving 
sense to reform aims and events and develop-
ing responses that follow the meanings, values 
and ambitions created in the past. The frames 
in use are largely the product of contextual 
factors in the specific “institutional matrix of 
local government” where central government 
reform ideas, local reality, written rules and 
constitutions coexist. Equally important are 
the informal conceptions of appropriateness: 
what is considered acceptable and what is 
considered less acceptable.
Above we described the time and place of 
conflicts in two reforms that had applied dif-
ferent approaches to governance: namely, the 
network approach in the first and the hierar-
chy approach in the second. In the network 
model, conflicts became visible only in the 
very last part of the project, whereas in hier-
archy model, there were conflicts at many 
points of the process, especially those where 
relevant and concrete changes were experi-
enced.
The hierarchy model was able to fulfill the 
aims set for it quite successfully when evalu-
ated from the point of view of the goals of the 
reform process. The new structure was able to 
find ways to solve many problems that the 
individual municipalities had not tackled. Yet 
battles were fought on many fronts within the 
new structure, and the structure was opposed 
from many directions.
Hierarchy with the exercise of authority 
was necessary to implement structural chang-
es that contributed to the collection of re-
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sources and the improvement of service per-
formance. However, the exercise of authority 
was not able to make changes in institutions. 
Structures themselves changed, but somehow 
the institutions did not follow in step with 
those structural changes. Despite the fact that 
the Kainuu model had achieved good results 
in securing the services for the residents of the 
region, the residents and many local govern-
ment actors in Kainuu did not trust the re-
gional authorities and their decision-making 
and often relied on their old practices. Some 
of the functions of the joint organization were 
still judged strictly from the municipal point 
of view. This culminated in a situation where 
a successful structure was abandoned.
The network model did not have to func-
tion in an atmosphere of continuous conflicts. 
On the contrary, it seemed to proceed pain-
lessly and in an ambience of vast consensus 
and harmony. Airaksinen (2009, 187) has de-
scribed the reform in such terms as organized 
inefficiency and rational apathy, referring to 
a set of dynamics where many reports and 
plans are produced but where concrete deci-
sions on new ways of function are rare. Many 
things were done to avoid having to change 
anything. The rhetorical reality produced a 
rosy picture of the reform, which did not solve 
any of the wicked problems facing local gov-
ernment. From the point of view of the reform 
and its goals, this approach was not a great 
success. However a look at the reality pro-
duced by the network model reveals that a lot 
of interaction took place in the pilot districts; 
interaction that has been crucial to the future 
of their structures. Three out of five of the 
pilot regions have planned a large district-
wide amalgamation and two of them have 
been able to implement it after the reform. 
The actors see the plans made, and the per-
sonal networks created during the project, as 
one of the most important factors behind the 
structural changes that are later voluntarily 
executed in practice.
When we contemplate on this develop-
ment from the point of view of institutional 
change, we see that structural change does not 
necessarily lead to changes in the creation of 
institutional meaning. If institutions are to be 
changed consciously in a particular direction, 
there ought to be actors who work to change 
those meanings and reveal the logic underly-
ing the different frames used in making deci-
sions on actions taken during reform proc-
esses. In line with the ideas presented in our 
theoretical framework, habits, conventions, 
and routines as well as rules and practices de-
fine what kind of behavior is appropriate for 
specific actors in specific situations, probably 
even more than organizational arrangements.
Of course the network model does not nec-
essarily lead to institutional change or the de-
sired future either. Vast interaction may yield 
shared meanings, but the direction may not 
cheer up some of the actors involved in local 
government reforms. However, reform is deal-
ing with history, culture, interaction and mean-
ings as much as it is about management tech-
niques, structures or universal rationality.
Believing in interaction and networks can 
lead to legitimate processes of creating insti-
tutional change, but this is not necessarily the 
case. It can also lead to processes where much 
effort is used to reproduce old action patterns. 
The problem is that the approach is probably 
too slow for solving the problems now facing 
local governments. Slow processes that in-
volve many people can lead to innovative 
ways of taking care of things. This can be in-
terpreted as both a strength and a weakness of 
a system. In the worst of cases it leads to a 
blurred and shattered local level which is hard 
to monitor and evaluate.
Believing in structural change and creat-
ing big hierarchies with short processes hav-
ing tight schedules and fierce demands may 
produce visible changes quickly enough. The 
downside of this approach is that it may create 
conflicts that can burst anytime at anyplace, 
and in the end such conflicts can became 
critical from the point of view of the future of 
the structures. Big hierarchies require bu-
reaucracy. When going to bigger units, infor-
mal interaction is replaced by official interac-
tion that makes some of the processes slower 
and more rigid. It is easy to blame a clear 
structure, particularly if it is very big and 
faceless, for problems that it cannot solve. 
Creating new structures does not assure the 
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development of processes and practices. And 
it is these processes and practices via which 
local government functions can be im-
proved.
When considering this particularly in the 
context of local government, it is clear that 
any attempt to change institutions is no joy-
ride. Creating and changing institutions re-
quire muddling through an environment af-
fected by complex, reciprocal relationships 
between actors as well as functioning in an 
atmosphere of rival frames, all of which are 
based on arguments grounded in a different 
rationale.
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